It's about time. Critical infrastructure still written in C - particularly code that parses data from untrusted sources - is technical debt that is only going to get worse over time. It's not as if Rust is that much more difficult to write than C. Rust is explicitly designed to be what you'd get if you were to re-create C knowing what we know now about language design and code safety.
If 32-bit x86 support can be dropped for pragmatic reasons, so can these architectures. If people really, really want to preserve these architectures as ongoing platforms for the future, they need to step up and create a backend for the Rust toolchain that supports them.
Right now, there are approximately five languages that are presumed to be acceptable for core applications in the base system: C, C++, Shell (which probably means specifically bash), Perl, and Python. The most recent language to be added to that list is Python, about 20 years ago. That's not to say that everybody likes those languages (indeed, there's quite a few commenters here who I think would be surprised to learn that not only is C++ on this list, but that it's been on it for at least 25 years).
There's other languages that are considered acceptable, even desirable, languages to write applications in (e.g., Java, PHP, Go), but Rust is really the first language to compete sufficiently close to C's competence for people to contemplate adding it to the base-system-languages list. I'd say only Go has ever come close to approaching that threshold, but I've never seen it contemplated for something like systemd.
Interestingly, I wonder if the debates over the addition of C++, Python, and Perl to the base system language set were this acrimonious.
> Interestingly, I wonder if the debates over the addition of C++, Python, and Perl to the base system language set were this acrimonious.
I think any projects that are run by people that see themselves as "X-people" (like Python-people, Perl-people) always have a bit "ick" reaction to new languages being added to projects they might see as part of a language's community.
So say you're a C++ developer, contributed to APT over the years, see all of it linked to the C++ community which you are part of too, and someone wants to start migrating parts of it to Rust/$NewLang. I think it might sometimes affect more for these people than just the code, might even be "attacking" (strong word perhaps) their sense of identity, for better or worse.
I was (and am still) a C++ person. But I somehow became also a Rust person. I am sure some people felt attacked, but imho Rust has most of the characteristics that made C++ a good language and that's why I "embraced" Rust rather than felt attacked.
Yeah rust is not C++ but it really compliments C++ well. Each has their niche and tbh I see them converging into the two kings of the systems space rather than actually competing with each other.
If anyone sees that horrible mess of hacks around pre-STL C++'s lacks of namespace in combination with latest C++ features as part of the C++ community I'd be very surprised :D
If APT were a hardcore C++ project surely we'd have like adopted namespaces everywhere by now.
> I think any projects that are run by people that see themselves as "X-people" (like Python-people, Perl-people) always have a bit "ick" reaction to new languages being added to projects they might see as part of a language's community.
I would say that Pythonistas are quite accustomed to "(other) languages being added" to the Python ecosystem. After all, NumPy relies on Fortran, as well as C.
Asserting that kind of "ownership" over code seems rather distasteful to me. Maybe there would be less acrimony if developers got paid for it somehow.
Yeah, maybe Python was a bad example, didn't really think specifically about the languages I made as examples, they were just examples with the hope of making it easier to understand what exactly I was talking about.
Some communities indeed are better at embracing multiple languages, Python, JavaScript and Java/JVM comes to mind, where it isn't uncommon to call out to other languages.
> So say you're a C++ developer, contributed to APT over the years, see all of it linked to the C++ community which you are part of too, and someone wants to start migrating parts of it to Rust/$NewLang. I think it might sometimes affect more for these people than just the code, might even be "attacking" (strong word perhaps) their sense of identity, for better or worse.
How is language relevant here? If someone just rewrote it in the same language instead of a different one, do you feel the reaction would be significantly better?
This is really a Rust specific thing, since so many C++ projects were 1-on-1 translated to Rust only changing the licence.
Rust has been the tool of choice for stealing GPL3 open source projects where some people have spent all their free time on at some point in their life.
Rewriting software is not "stealing" it. That is an absurd framing, and one that seems akin to the arguments employed against FOSS software in the first place back in the 1980s and 1990s.
In your view, was writing a BIOS re-implementation from scratch "stealing" from IBM? Are all of the vaguely Unix-compatible operating systems "stealing" from Unix (ATT/Bell)? Why is the "free time" of the original developer more sacrosanct than the "free time" of the re-implementer?
I don't think they mean stealing in a legal/ownership sense, but stealing in the "I can no longer say this is my project" (control/intellectual/credit) sense.
> Why is the "free time" of the original developer more sacrosanct than the "free time" of the re-implementer?
This has nothing to do with free time. It has to do with the fact that the former actually went through a ton of pain to get the project from its original conception and past bugs & design flaws into its current useful state, and the latter is merely translating the solution right in front of them. And not only is the latter going to deprive the former of the ability to even say "this is my project" (despite them having spent years or decades on its design etc.), but they're also probably going to be able to take the whole thing in a different direction, effectively leaving the original author behind.
Whether you feel this is a good or a bad thing for society aside, it should be obvious why this could be genuinely upsetting in some situations.
Sure, it's upsetting. IBM was upset about BIOS being cloned, Bell got upset about Unix being cloned, Oracle got upset about the JDK being cloned, etc. Many of them were upset enough to engage in decade-long lawsuits. But we'd ultimately be in a much worse place if "avoiding making original creators upset" was the primary factor in development, over things like compatibility, bugs, performance, security etc.
I happen to like living in a world where Pipewire can just be a drop in replacement for PulseAudio that can implement the same APIs and do everything that PulseAudio does but better. Or where I can play my games on Linux because Valve re-implemented DirectX and all the Windows platform libraries. Or where there are half a dozen "vim" clones to pick from if I want to. If there are broad, tangible benefits to rewriting a piece of software, then it ought to be rewritten, hurt feelings nonwithstanding.
I don't really understand the argument that the original author gets deprived of anything by a piece of free software being rewritten, certainly not credit. Obviously stealing the name would be a dick move and maybe open you up to legal action but that's not really what happens 99.99% of the time.
> Sure, it's upsetting. IBM was upset about BIOS being cloned, Bell got upset about Unix being cloned, Oracle got upset about the JDK being cloned, etc.
This is not like that though; moving from a pro-user license to a pro-business license is the reason for being upset, not just losing control over the product.
With the move, any future improvements run the very real risk of being extended then closed off by tech companies.
It's simply hubris for an entire community of developers to look at an existing working product that got popular due to the goal of being pro-user, then say to themselves "we can replace it with this new thing I created, but in order for my new thing to gain traction it must be immediately favourable to big business to close off".
If you view it in that light, then, yeah, you can understand why the upset people are upset, even if you don't agree with them.
> Many of them were upset enough to engage in decade-long lawsuits. But we'd ultimately be in a much worse place if "avoiding making original creators upset" was the primary factor in development, over things like compatibility, bugs, performance, security etc.
Original creators did frequently get upset, but the difference between "some individual forked the code or cloned the product" is very different to "an entire community celebrating a gradual but persistent and constant effort by the same community to move the ecosystem away from a pro-user license".
I hope this gives you some insight into why people are upset, even if you don't agree with them. Most of them aren't articulating it like I did.
[EDIT: I'm thinking of this like an Overton-Window equivalent, shifting from pro-user to pro-business. It seems like an accurate analogy: some people don't want this shift to happen while others are actively pushing for it. This is obviously going to result in conflict.]
You're conflating two different things. The purpose of rewriting it is not to change the license. The purpose of rewriting it is to provide a modernized alternative with some benefits from the choice of language -- and the choice of license is incidental.
Kinda like how the purpose of creating LLVM was to create a more extensible compiler framework, not to create a permissively licensed compiler. As it happens the license of LLVM has not really led to the proprietary hellscape that some people suggested it would, and in any case the technical benefits vastly outweigh the drawbacks. Companies like Apple that do have proprietary compilers based on LLVM are difficult to describe as "freeloaders" in practice because they contribute so much back to the project.
> The purpose of rewriting it is not to change the license.
I didn't say it was.
> The purpose of rewriting it is to provide a modernized alternative with some benefits from the choice of language
I did not contend that either.
> and the choice of license is incidental.
This I disagree with - the license choice is not incidental; it is foundational to gain popularity in a hurry, to gain widespread adoption at corporates.
The rewriter's intentions is to gain popularity over the incumbent software; using a pro-user license does not gain popularity for all those pro-business use-cases.
The license switch from pro-user to pro-business is not incidental. It's deliberate, and it's too achieve the stated goal of replacing the existing software.
This is one place where I feel that the ends do not justify the means.
The difference is in the cases you mention these are massive companies with plenty of money simply trying to protect their revenue streams, whereas here we're talking about open source maintainers that are often doing this for the sake of their love for the project and the users, and getting very little other than recognition or ability to influence the project in return. It's not like you're talking about making a billionaire make a million less than he otherwise would.
Moreover, often these folks have rare expertise in those subjects, and/or rare willingness to work on them as open side projects. If you tell them this is just something they have to deal with, I wouldn't be surprised if you also remove some of the incentives folks have to keep contributing to OSS voluntarily in the first place. Very little money, and massive risk of losing control, recognition, etc. even if you "succeed"... how many people are still going to bother? And then you get shocked, shocked that OSS is losing to proprietary software and dying.
The primary benefit of FOSS over proprietary software is, in fact, the ability and willingness to change things and open up changes to a wider pool of developers. Fiefdoms are actively hostile to open source principles. Obviously it's good to treat people with respect but you shouldn't let worse code win out just because of ego alone. Sometimes software gets forked or rewritten and sometimes the fork/rewrite wins out, that's evolution and competition and it keeps the ecosystem healthy.
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> Shell (which probably means specifically bash)
Debian has ongoing efforts to make many shell scripts (like postinst Scripts in packages etc.) non-bash-specific.
A minimal Debian installation doesn't contain bash, but rather dash, which doesn't support bash extensions.
> A minimal Debian installation doesn't contain bash, but rather dash, which doesn't support bash extensions.
Please don't make up wrong facts that would be trivial to check first.
All minimal Debian installations include bash as it is an essential package. Where essential is used in the sense of https://www.debian.org/doc/debian-policy/ch-binary.html#esse...
Whether with a base install via the installer, or debootstrap, I've never seen bash missing.
For clarity, 'sh' is what is softlinked to dash. Not bash.
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> there are approximately five languages that are presumed to be acceptable for core applications in the base system: [...] Python
I don't know if you've tried to get someone else's Python running recently, but it has devolved into a disaster effectively requiring containers to accurately replicate the exact environment it was written in.
Core system applications should be binaries that run with absolutely minimal dependencies outside of default system-wide libraries. Heck, I would go as far as to say applications in the critical path to repairing a system (like apt) should be statically linked since we no longer live in a storage constrained world.
> I don't know if you've tried to get someone else's Python running recently, but it has devolved into a disaster effectively requiring containers to accurately replicate the exact environment it was written in.
Please show me a project where you believe you "effectively require containers" just to run the code, and I will do my best to refute that.
> since we no longer live in a storage constrained world.
I think you do care about the storage use if you're complaining about containers.
And I definitely care, on principle. It adds up.
For reasons I can only assume have to do with poorly configured CI, pip gets downloaded billions of times annually (https://pypistats.org/packages/pip), and I assume those files get unpacked and copied all the time since there would be no good reason to use uv to install pip. That's dozens of petabytes of disk I/O.
> Please show me a project where you believe you "effectively require containers" just to run the code
I guess GP meant "containers" broadly, including things like pipx, venv, or uv. Those are, effectively, required since PEP 668:
https://stackoverflow.com/questions/75608323/how-do-i-solve-...
> "containers" broadly, including things like pipx, venv, or uv.
This statement makes no sense. First off, those are three separate tools, which do entirely different things.
The sort of "container" you seem to have in mind is a virtual environment. The standard library `venv` module provides the base-line support to create them. But there is really hardly anything to them. The required components are literally a symlink to Python, a brief folder hierarchy, and a five-or-so-line config file. Pipx and uv are (among other things) managers for these environments (which manage them for different use cases; pipx is essentially an end-user tool).
Virtual environments are nowhere near a proper "container" in terms of either complexity or overhead. There are people out there effectively simulating a whole new OS installation (and more) just to run some code (granted this is often important for security reasons, since some of the code running might not be fully trusted). A virtual environment is... just a place to install dependencies (and they do after all have to go somewhere), and a scheme for selecting which of the dependencies on local storage should be visible to the current process (and for allowing the process to find them).
> This statement makes no sense. First off, those are three separate tools, which do entirely different things.
They are all various attempts at solving the same fundamental problem, which I broadly referred to as containerization (dependency isolation between applications). I avoided using the term "virtual environment" because I was not referring to venv exclusively.
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and storage is a big deal for debian! It is basically the other player in embedded Linux other than rolling your own where a 4GB or smaller emmc is pretty common.
this is not normally a problem for a distro where the environment is well known
It is such a non problem it forced them to hack a „fuck you this Python is owned by the distribution not you“ message into pip requiring you to agree to „breaking your system“ to use it.
Of all the languages, python in the base system has been an unmitigated garbage fire.
> it forced them to hack a
It was not their action, nor is it hacked, nor is the message contained within pip.
The system works by pip voluntarily recognizing a marker file, the meaning of which was defined by https://peps.python.org/pep-0668/ — which was the joint effort of people representing multiple Linux distros, pip, and Python itself. (Many other tools ignore the system Python environment entirely, as mine will by default.)
Further, none of this causes containers to be necessary for installing ordinary projects.
Further, it is not a problem unique to Python. The distro simply can't package all the Python software out there available for download; it's completely fair that people who use the Python-native packaging system should be expected not to interfere with a system package manager that doesn't understand that system. Especially when the distro wants to create its tools in Python.
You only notice it with Python because distros aren't coming with JavaScript, Ruby etc. pre-installed in order to support the system.
Well the essential system Python should be in /usr/sbin and read-only (insofar Python allows that with its __pycache__ spam).
The fact that users have to keep up with multiple PEPs, error messages, --single-version-externally-managed, --break-system-packages, config files everywhere, stealth packages in .local and uv to paper over all of this shows that Python packaging is completely broken.
> the essential system Python should be in /usr/sbin
There's still quite a bit you can do with the "system Python". Mine includes NumPy, bindings for GTK, QT5 and QT6, Freetype, PIL....
> insofar Python allows that with its __pycache__ spam
This is, to my understanding, precisely why the standard library is pre-compiled during installation (when the process already has sudo rights, and can therefore create the `__pycache__` folders in those locations). This leverages the standard library `compileall` module — from the Makefile:
> The fact that users have to keep up with multiple PEPs, error messages, --single-version-externally-managed, --break-system-packages, config files everywhere, stealth packages in .local and uv to paper over all of this shows that Python packaging is completely broken.@ # Build PYC files for the 3 optimization levels (0, 1, 2) -PYTHONPATH=$(DESTDIR)$(LIBDEST) $(RUNSHARED) \ $(PYTHON_FOR_BUILD) -Wi $(DESTDIR)$(LIBDEST)/compileall.py \ -o 0 -o 1 -o 2 $(COMPILEALL_OPTS) -d $(LIBDEST) -f \ -x 'bad_coding|badsyntax|site-packages' \ $(DESTDIR)$(LIBDEST)Please do not spread FUD.
They don't have to do any of that. All they have to do is make a virtual environment, which can have any name, and the creation of which is explicitly supported by the standard library. Further, reading the PEPs is completely irrelevant to end users. They only describe the motivation for changes like --break-system-packages. Developers may care about PEPs, but they can get a better summary of the necessary information from https://packaging.python.org ; and none of the problems there have anything to do with Linux system Python environments. The config files that developers care about are at the project root.
Today, on any Debian system, you can install an up-to-date user-level copy of yt-dlp (for example) like so, among many other options:
You only have to know how one of many options works, in order to get a working system.sudo apt install pipx pipx install yt-dlp> All they have to do is make a virtual environment
Okay so to create a five line script I have to make a virtual environment. Then I have to activate and deactivate it whenever using it. And I have to remember to update the dependenceis regularly. For my five line script.
Seems to me the companies managing mloc-codebases pushed their tradeoffs on everyone else.
You, too: please do not spread FUD.
> Okay so to create a five line script... For my five line script.
I can guarantee that your "five line script" simply does not have the mess of dependencies you imagine it to have. I've had projects run thousands of lines using nothing but the standard library before.
> Then I have to activate and deactivate it whenever using it.
No, you do not. Activation scripts exist as an optional convenience because the original author of the third-party `virtualenv` liked that design. They just manipulate some environment variables, and normally the only relevant one is PATH. Which is to say, "activation" works by putting the environment's path to binaries at the front of the list. You can equally well just give the path to them explicitly. Or symlink them from somewhere more convenient for you (like pipx already does for you automatically).
> And I have to remember to update the dependenceis regularly.
No, you do not in general. No more so than for any other software.
Programs do not stop working because of the time elapsed since they were written. They stop working because the world around them changes. For many projects this is not a real concern. (Did you know there is tons of software out there that doesn't require an Internet connection to run? So it is automatically invulnerable to web sites changing their APIs, for example.) You don't have to remember to keep on top of that; when it stops working, you check if an update resolves the problem.
If your concern is with getting security updates (for free, applying to libraries you also got for free, all purely on the basis of the good will of others) for your dependencies, that is ultimately a consequence of your choice to have those dependencies. That's the same in every language that offers a "package ecosystem".
This also, er, has nothing to do with virtual environments.
> Seems to me the companies managing mloc-codebases pushed their tradeoffs on everyone else.
Not at all. They are the ones running into the biggest problems. They are the ones who have created, or leveraged, massive automation systems for containers, virtualization etc. — and probably some of it is grossly unnecessary, but they aren't putting in the time to think about the problem clearly.
And now we have a world where pip gets downloaded from PyPI literally billions of times a year.
Thank you! Exactly what I wanted to explain.
Yet, if I write a dockerfile, and need to use perl, system perl is fine.
If I need a python script, I have to arrange for all the RUN lines to live inside a virtual environment inside the container.
People are too harsh on this. It's not hard to install a version manager and set your primary python to that. Which is just good hygiene.
My understanding of the reasoning is that python-based system packages having dependencies managed through pip/whatever present a system stability risk. So they chose this more conservative route, as is their MO.
Honestly if there is one distribution to expect those kinds of shennanigans on it would be Debian. I don't know how anybody chooses to use that distro without adding a bunch of APT sources and a language version manager.
yes because then you're starting to use non-distro python packages. If you want to do that, use a virtualenv, there is no safe other way (even if there was no python in the base system) .
Yes, the distro people are strong believers in virtual environments as best practice - for you, not them.
There's a good reason for this. The average user has no idea and doesn't care what language some random distro-packaged program is written in. They want to be able to run ubxtool or gdal_calc or virt-manager or whatever without setting up a virtual environment. Python developers on the other hand should be adept at such things, should they choose to use a non-distro packaged version of something.
The tricky part is when "users" start using pip to install something because someone told them to.
This should become the official error message!
Can you expand? I'm honestly curious how it is not a problem in Pythons case
That asks GP to prove a negative. What problems have you encountered, and why do you believe them to be common?
It really, really isn't. I wish this would stop being repeated so much.
Is X11/KDE considered part of the "base system"? If yes, then:
... isn't so surprising.> indeed, there's quite a few commenters here who I think would be surprised to learn that not only is C++ on this list, but that it's been on it for at least 25 yearsThe Debian base system is much, much smaller. I'm surprised that people consider Python to be part of it. However, APT depends on Perl and the C++ run-time library, so those two languages have been part of the base system for a very long time.
> I'm surprised that people consider Python to be part of it. However, APT depends on Perl
Pardon?
$ file `which apt` /usr/local/bin/apt: Python script, ASCII text executableWhich apt is that?
? file `which apt`
/usr/bin/apt: ELF 64-bit LSB pie executable, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked, interpreter /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2, BuildID[sha1]=157631f2617f73dee730273c7c598fd4d17b7284, for GNU/Linux 3.2.0, stripped
Debian doesn't ship files in /usr/local.
You can of course add your own "apt" binary in /usr/local/bin/apt which can be written in any language you like, say COBOL, Java, Common Lisp or Python.
Ah, of course. I guess this wrapper is provided by Mint.
I am curious: What does the wrapper do? Can you share the source code here?
It appears to re-organize various apt-related commands and sub-commands (including ones provided by additional distro-specific scripts) so that they're all available as sub-commands of `apt`. I don't do much micro-management so I haven't really thought about what the "proper" underlying commands are, except when I've had to look up specific `dpkg` invocations. It's about 200 lines.
Sorry, I meant that something in the package management stack depends on Perl (not APT specifically).
It looks like in trixie, it's libpam-modules that pulls in debconf, which is written in Perl. And libpam-modules is required by util-linux, which is Essential: yes.
I wonder how much of that Perl support is simply regex and other parsing utilities.
I’ve notice a lot of that in base OS systems
Its a curiosity more than anything though
A substantial fraction of apt is written in perl. It's actually still pretty core to debian, even if applications are using it less.
There is no Perl code in APT itself, nor in dpkg on the installing side; Perl is used by dpkg-dev, i.e. when building packages.
Ah, my apologies. I must admit I am not entirely clear on where the boundaries are between the different tools and other elements of the debian packaging process.
I'm sure the Debian base system doesn't include GUI stuff at all.
> In particular, our code to parse .deb, .ar, .tar, and the HTTP signature verification code would strongly benefit from memory safe languages
> Critical infrastructure still written in C - particularly code that parses data from untrusted sources - is technical debt that is only going to get worse over time.
But hasn't all that foundational code been stable and wrung out already over the last 30+ years? The .tar and .ar file formats are both from the 70s; what new benefits will users or developers gain from that thoroughly battle-tested code being thrown out and rewritten in a new language with a whole new set of compatibility issues and bugs?
I wish, but I get new security bugs in those components like every year or so, not all are tracked with security updates to be fair, some we say it's your own fault if you use the library to parse untrusted code.
After all the library wasn't designed around safety, we assumed the .debs you pass to it are trusted in some way - because you publish them to your repository or you are about to install them so they have root maintainer scripts anyway.
But as stuff like hosting sites and PPAs came up, we have operators publishing debs for untrusted users, and hence suddenly there was a security boundary of sorts and these bugs became problematic.
Of course memory safety here is only one concern, if you have say one process publishing repos for multiple users, panics can also cause a denial of service, but it's a step forward from potential code execution exploits.
I anticipate the rewrites to be 1 to 1 as close as possible to avoid introducing bugs, but then adding actual unit tests to them.
"The best laid plans of mice and men often go awry."
> But hasn't all that foundational code been stable and wrung out already over the last 30+ years?
Not necessarily. The "HTTP signature verification code" sounds like it's invoking cryptography, and the sense I've had from watching the people who maintain cryptographic libraries is that the "foundational code" is the sort of stuff you should run away screaming from. In general, it seems to me to be the cryptography folks who have beat the drum hardest for moving to Rust.
As for other kind of parsing code, the various archive file formats aren't exactly evolving, so there's little reason to update them. On the other hand, this is exactly the kind of space where there's critical infrastructure that has probably had very little investment in adversarial testing either in the past or present, and so it's not clear that their age has actually led to security-critical bugs being shaken out. Much as how OpenSSL had a trivially-exploitable, high criticality exploit for two years before anybody noticed.
Actual cryptography code, the best path is formally verified implementations of the crypto algorithms; with parsers for wrapper formats like OpenPGP or PKCS#7 implemented in a memory safe language.
You don't want the core cryptography implemented in Rust for Rust's sake when there's a formally verified Assembler version next to it. Formally verified _always_ beats anything else.
I should have clarified that I was primarily referring to the stuff dealing with all the wrapper formats (like PKIX certificate verification), not the core cryptographic algorithms themselves.
The core cryptographic algorithms, IMHO, should be written in a dedicated language for writing cryptographic algorithms so that they can get formally-verified constant-time assembly out of it without having to complain to us compiler writers that we keep figuring out how to deobfuscate their branches.
Sure. But assembly implementations by definition are not portable. And I don’t know what it takes to write a formally verified library line this, but I bet it’s very expensive.
In contrast, a rust implementation can be compiled into many architectures easily, and use intrinsically safer than a C version.
Plus cryptography and PKI is constantly evolving. So it can’t benefit from the decades old trusted implementations.
> Formally verified _always_ beats anything else.
Formally verified in an obscure language where it's difficult to find maintainers does not beat something written in a more "popular" language, even if it hasn't been formally verified (yet?).
And these days I would (unfortunately) consider assembly as an "obscure language".
(At any rate, I assume Rust versions of cryptographic primitives will still have some inline assembly to optimize for different platforms, or, at the very least, make use of compile intrinsics, which are safer than assembly, but still not fully safe.)
With crypto, you really want to just write the assembly, due to timing issues that higher level languages simply cannot guarantee.
It's insanely complex, particularly you want _verified_ crypto. Last year (or two years ago?) I had to fix a tiny typo in OpenSSL's ARM assembly for example, it was breaking APT and Postgres left and right, but only got triggered on AWS :D
You don't want to write the whole thing in assembly, just the parts that need to be constant time. Even those are better written as called subroutines called from the main implementation.
Take BLAKE3 as an example. There's asm for the critical bits, but the structural parts that are going to be read most often are written in rust like the reference impl.
Yes, for sure.
I would like a special purpose language to exist precisely for writing crytographic code where you always want the constant time algorithm. In this niche language "We found a 20% speed-up for Blemvich-Smith, oops, it actually isn't constant time on the Arrow Lake micro-code version 18 through 46" wouldn't even get into a nightly let alone be released for use.
It seems that for reasons I don't understand this idea isn't popular and people really like hand rolling assembly.
There's been plenty, like RobustIsoCrypt or FaCT:
https://github.com/PLSysSec/FaCT
They struggle to guarantee constant time for subroutines within a non-constant time application, which is how most people want to use cryptography.
I do think this is pretty much the one use case for a true "portable assembler", where it basically is assembly except the compiler will do the register allocation and instruction selection for you (so you don't have to deal with, e.g., the case that add32 y, x, 0xabcdef isn't an encodable instruction because the immediate is too large).
You can't avoid those with NASA Power of 10 sorts of restrictions?
If you mean GnuPG, that is what Snowden used. It could be better than new software that may have new bugs. Memory safety is a very small part of cryptographic safety.
(New cryptographic software can also be developed by all sorts of people. In this case I'm not familiar, but we do know that GnuPG worked for the highest profile case imaginable.)
GPG works great if you use it to encrypt and decrypt emails manually as the authors intended. The PGP/GPG algorithms were never intended for use in APIs or web interfaces.
Ironically, it was the urge not to roll your own cryptography that got people caught in GPG-related security vulnerabilities.
There are none. This is a canonical employee trying to force Ubuntu's decisions (rust coretools) on the wider Debian community.
Additionally, the fact that this comes across as so abrasive and off-putting is on brand for online Rust evangelicalism.
> But hasn't all that foundational code been stable and wrung out already over the last 30+ years?
No: a little less than 5 years ago there was CVE-2020-27350, a memory safety bug in the tar/ar implementations.
But just this year there was CVE-2025-62518 in tokio-tar.
Every software is stable and wrung out until someone finds an exploit.
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Recently the rust coreutils had a bug and this essentially disabled auto-updates on Ubuntu. :)
Seeing this tone-deaf message from an Ubuntu employee would be funny if I didn’t actually use Ubuntu. Looks like I have to correct that…
Isn't it also funny that all of these things are done by the same person?
In all seriousness though, let me assure you that I plan to take a very considerate approach to Rust in APT. A significant benefit of doing Rust in APT rather than rewriting APT from scratch in Rust means that we can avoid redoing all our past mistakes because we can look at our own code and translate it directly.
You have never been skilled at being considerate:
https://github.com/keepassxreboot/keepassxc/issues/10725#iss...
Christ that was handled badly.
Honestly having seen trainwreck after trainwreck after trainwreck come out of Canonical for the last decade, I'm sure I'm not the only one that has strong doubts about anyone associated being able to "avoid redoing past mistakes" or to make things not suck.
Seems reasonable. I wish you would have written that in your original message. Good luck…
The Fil-C project ( https://fil-c.org/ ) seems like a more pragmatic way to deal with C security holes in old, well-loved userspace code. It effectively turns C into a managed language rather than a bare metal one, seems to remove a lot of the impetus to rewrite.
I really like the idea of Fil-C for derisking legacy code, but
- It's not an option for debian core infrastructure until it supports at least the same platforms debian does (arm, riscv, etc) and it currently only supports x86_64.
- It doesn't turn C into a modern language, since it looks like there's active development here getting the productivity benefits of moving away from C is likely still worth it.
If C isn't going away yet, just doing filc for x84_64 might still be a big win as it could catch a lot of stuff at runtime for x84_64 users that can then be fixed for everyone.
Given that a few languages from similar timeframe are still around, even if with fewer users, it is guaranteed to stay around as long as current computing models stay relevant.
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If you're single platform (Fil-C is x86-64 only), if the program is finished (Fil-C doesn't magically make maintaining a C project any easier to handle) and if performance isn't relevant (Fil-C is and despite its originator's confidence always will be bigger and slower than what you have today) then I agree.
Making core package infrastructure 10x slower doesn't seem especially pragmatic.
The author's benchmarks suggest 10× would be a pathological case!
But even so - what price correct & secure software? We all lost a tonne of performance overnight when we applied the first Meltdown and Spectre workarounds. This doesn't seem much different.
We have an alternative that isn't 10x slower, and comes with many other benefits (Rust). The only cost is losing hardware support for some very obsolete and very unpopular platforms. (Nevermind that Fil-C's hardware support is narrower than Rust's.)
Rust doesn't automatically add memory safety to all existing C code, which will need to be maintained for decades, Fil-C nearly does and its still early days.
> We have an alternative that isn't 10x slower, and comes with many other benefits
Anyone involved with development around a fruity company would say Swift ;)
I don't get the impression the Swift team is especially interested in use cases outside of OS X and iOS. (The context here is Debian.)
There seems to be a push to get Swift outside of just Apples platforms, namely Linux and Android support and backend micro service developnent.
It is not only about memory safety. C community is aging fast and young developers choose different languages. We started to rewrite all C and C++ code in my team because it is really hard to find people willing to maintain it. From my experience typical C or C++ programer is around 40 and not willing to switch jobs.
Inviting rank amateurs to established projects while expecting them to operate as free labor in the hopes of future relevance for employment has a distinctly different feel. Missives like the OP feel like preying on a desperate and young generation when paired with the commentary.
If all the entry-level jobs are C or C++, do you think companies would have a hard time filling them? Would the unemployed new graduates really shun gainful employment if Rust wasn't part of the equation?
Meanwhile, hiring managers left and right are reporting that within hours of a job being posted, they are flooded with hundreds of applications. And you can't find a single person because of the programming language of your stack? And to remedy this, you're going to rewrite your stack in an unproven language? Have you considered that if you can't find anyone that it might not be a programming language or tech stack problem?
My experience in working in C++ was that the salary wasn’t as good as what I could get elsewhere. That was a big part of why I left, I didn’t hate the job.
Wow, I've never considered this aspect of it but you're right. If you want widespread access to incoming developers that can contribute to your project, that really does mean Rust by default at this point if you want a low level language regardless of what you prefer.
A pity the banks didn't do that with COBOL....
They did, Java and .NET.
Is the pay good at your job? Rust jobs are few and far between, so I think Rustafarians are willing to take lower pay to work in their dream language. Companies will of course abuse this.
I agree that new software should be written in Rust or another, safer language. But I don't agree that it's wise to start retrofitting old software in this way. New code is almost always worse in quality than old code, and I do not believe that the safety gains from Rust are so advantageous that they will offset that factor.
Would this logically extend to also include C-reliant languages like Python and Ruby (the latter being mostly a grammar underpinned by C) as technical debt also?
Yes, which is why in 2025 it is a good idea to use Rust with python bindings for your performance sensitive code.
A lot of the C code used in python is calling out to old, battle tested and niche libraries so it is unlikely that someone is going to replace those any time soon but Rust is definitely increasing as time goes on for greenfield work.
Most Python libraries that relies on C are numerical stuff.
From experience with this type of code you typically end up with a load of functions that take in a numpy array and its length/dimensions to a C function that works on that array in place or an output array that was also supplied. In terms of getting this wrong, it’s usually a crash caused by out of bounds memory access which would still be a runtime crash in Rust. So I’m not sure there’s a massive benefit for these types of code other than the fun of learning Rust. Other than that, you’re typically writing C/C++ to interface with C and Fortran libraries that are really battle tested, and for which it will take decades for Rust to have equivalents. So moving to Rust will just cause you to have lots of unsafe statements - not a bad thing necessarily if you are doing a lot of work at the C level in existing code but less of a benefit if you are doing a straight wrap of a library.
On the flip side, things on the web side of Python like uWSGI which is written in C are important for the security aspect but they’re a very small part of the Python ecosystem.
Not really.
All (current) languages eventually have a compiler/runtime that is memory unsafe. This is basically fine because it's a tiny amount of surface area (relative to the amount of code that uses it) and it exists in a way that the input to is relatively benign so there's enough eyes/time/... to find bugs.
There's also nothing stopping you from re-implementing python/ruby/... in a safer way once that becomes the low hanging fruit to improve computer reliability.
> basically fine
How many type confusion 0 days and memory safety issues have we had in dynamic language engines again? I've really lost count.
Are you counting ones that involve running malicious code in a sandbox and not just trusted code on untrusted input? Because then I'd agree, but that's a much harder and different problem.
My impression is that for the trusted code untrusted input case it hasn't been that many, but I could be wrong.
It depends, what language was the sandbox written in?
Sandboxes are difficult independent of language, see all the recent speculation vulnerabilities for instance. Sure, worse languages make it even harder, but I think we're straying from the original topic of "python/ruby" by considering sandboxes at all.
How many ways to cause a segmentation fault in CPython, that don't start with deliberate corruption of the bytecode, are you aware of?
How is "type confusion" a security issue?
> Rust is explicitly designed to be what you'd get if you were to re-create C knowing what we know now about language design and code safety.
I don't know about that. Look at the code for the COSMIC desktop environment's clock widget (the cosmic-applet-time directory under <https://github.com/pop-os/cosmic-applets>), for example. It's pretty much unreadable compared to a C code base of similar complexity (GNU coreutils, for example: <https://savannah.gnu.org/projects/coreutils/>).
I think this is a you problem
as in that "isn't the style of code you are used too"
I don't think "how well people not familiar with you language can read it" is a relevant metric for most languages.
Also IMHO while C feels readable it isn't when it matters. Because it very often just doesn't include information you need when reading. Like looking at function header doesn't tell you if a ptr is nullable, or if a mut ptr is a changeable input value or instead is a out ptr. which is supposed to point to unitialized memory and if there is an error how that affects the state of the validity of any mutable ptrs passed in. To just name some example (lets not even get started about pre processor macros pretending to be C functions). In conclusion while C seems nice to read it is IMHO often a painful experience to "properly" read it e.g. in context of a code review.
As a side note: The seemingly verbose syntax of e.g. `chrono::DateTime` comes from there being 2 DateTime-types in use in the module, one from the internationalization library (icu) and one from a generic time library (chronos). Same for Sender, etc. That isn't a supper common issue, but happens sometimes.
I think the Rust example’s biggest readability sin is using the full names of things like foo::bar::Baz instead of just Baz, but I get why they did that. When you import a lot of things into a file the latter way, it’s easy to get lost in “was that a foo Baz or a wiz Baz?” Sometimes it’s easier just to use the long names everywhere to be explicit.
If I wanted to tweak the Rust project, I’d feel pretty confident I was calling the right things with the right params.
That's a style choice that I think comes from former C++ devs.
Java can potentially have the same problem. But because everyone uses an IDE and because it's rarely really an issue, everyone will simply import `Baz` rather than worry about the Foo::Baz and Bat::Baz collision. It does happen in java code, but I can't stress how infrequently it's actually a problem.
I don’t think that’s quite right. I haven’t written C++ since the 90s, and I use IDEs (Emacs and Zed), but I still sometimes reach a mental threshold where I look at my screen and see way too many names to have to hold in my mental buffer, then decide to make them more explicit.
IDK what the state of Emac/Zed is in terms of type information (I'm sure it depends on the language in question). For Jetbrains/Eclipse/Netbeans if there's a question about a type you can ctrl+click on the type and immediately pull all information about it.
In java, I rarely pay attention to the `import` section (and I know most devs at my company).
You can look up `using namespace std;` in google and you'll find a lot of articles saying it's a bad practice in C++. Everyone recommends writing the full `std::cout` rather than `cout`.
All modern editors do that pretty well with language servers now. Specifically, Emacs and Zed do this perfectly with Rust.
I do think it’s down to personal preference. With the fully qualified names, I can look at the screen and follow the flow without having to mouse over the various names in play. For that matter, I could print it out if I wanted to and still have all the information.
I don’t think you’re objectively wrong. It’s more that we have different approaches to managing the complexity when it gets hairy.
I just import them with unique names if there is a collision - Wiz_Baz and Foo_Baz
That's an apples to oranges comparison.
Most of the code in that module is dedicated to the gui maintenance. The parts that do deal with time are perfectly legible.
> pretty much unreadable
I disagree. Both seem perfectly readable, assuming you know their preferred coding styles. As a non-C programmer, I absolutely despise running into #ifndef SOME_OBSCURE_NAME and `while (n) { if (g) {` but C (and in the latter case Go) programmers seem to love that style.
Comparing a bunch of small, barely integrated command line programs to a UI + calendar widget doesn't seem "of similar complexity" to me. Looking at a C clock widget (https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/app/xclock/-/blob/master...) the difference seems pretty minimal to me. Of course, the XClock code doesn't deal with calendars, so you have to imagine the extra UI code for that too.
https://cgit.git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/coreutils.git/tree/sr...
I beg to differ.
A lot of the complexity is to handle localized date formats on systems that support them. Most other implementations of 'date' do not do this.
The easiest way to see this is in US locales, which use 12-hour clocks in GNU 'date' but not other implementations:
I added a test case for that recently, since it is a nice usability feature [1].$ date -d '13:00' Sat Nov 1 01:00:00 PM PDT 2025 $ uu_date -d '13:00' Sat Nov 1 13:00:00 2025[1] https://github.com/coreutils/coreutils/commit/1066d442c2c023...
To be fair GUI code is going to be harder to read than a non-interactive utility, in any two languages
rust is kinda ugly. i think i like zig better.
Actually I agree. I wish Rust kept the basic C syntax for function etc. I really hate def, fn, and other such keywords.
This is a false dichotomy. There are memory-safe languages that are already proven and accepted in core Debian code that don't come with the downsides of Rust.
Oh please, in a decade Rust will also be technical debt and people will be wanting to write it in Brust or whatever is the trendy new language.
It’s been ten years since Rust 1.0, if that were to happen, we’d be seeing it now. But we don’t.
but we do... 4 years after Rust, we got a first glimpse at Zig. Even today, there's a lot of people that believe that Zig would have been a better choice for the Linux kernel than Rust.
And the answer to "why now" is quite simple - Because of the whole Rust in kernel debate, people started scrutinizing the situation.
Then Zig people should be the focus of “this kids and their new shiny” criticism, not Rust.
People who become aware of something only when it’s being used by something huge also aren’t early adopters either. Rust has already been in the Windows kernel for years at this point, with none of this consternation.
That makes no sense. It was much longer than 10 years before people considered C to be tech debt for example. Idk if it will be 10 years exactly, but we are seeing better languages emerging (Swift 6, Mojo, probably others) that provide the same safety guarantees and performance/use case profiles as Rust, but are vastly more ergonomic and lovely to use. I fear Linux was hasty integrating Rust because it will likely prevent them from integrating something better in the near future.
You’re the one that said ten years.
You're the one who said "ten years since Rust 1.0"
Right, that’s when Rust was new and shiny. People who chase the latest new shiny thing don’t consider ten year old technology new and shiny, they’d have moved on years ago.
The person who they replied to stated a decade. This whole thing is pretty clear cut and dry.
I said ten years from now...
C's been around for over 50 years. Yes, I would hope that something does replace replace Rust after 50 years.
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Memory safety is mostly a issue of the past. Clearly, there are new code bases with memory issue too. But we have tools to prevent that. The new security issues are supply chain attacks. And Cargo is the way to have exactly this.
> Memory safety is mostly an issue of the past.
Can you provide some evidence to support this? There’s a large body of evidence to the contrary, e.g. from Chrome[1].
> But we have tools to prevent that. The new security issues are supply chain attacks.
Speaking as a “supply chain security” person, this doesn’t really hold water. Supply chain attacks include the risk of memory unsafety lurking in complex dependency trees; it’s not an either-or.
[1]: https://www.chromium.org/Home/chromium-security/memory-safet...
What part of C package management defends against supply chain attacks?
Does it audit third-party code for you?
I think it's mostly the fact that C dependencies are much rarer and much harder to add and maintain.
The average C project has at most a handful of other C dependencies. The average Rust, Go or NodeJS project? A couple hundred.
Ironically, because dependency management is so easy in modern languages, people started adding a lot of dependencies everywhere. Need a leftpad? Just add one line in some yaml file or an "Alt-Enter" in an IDE. Done.
In C? That is a lot more work. If you do that, you do it for advanced for stuff you absolutely need for your project. Because it is not easy. In all likelihood you write that stuff yourself.
CVE-2024-3094 is it? You can argue that in C it is much easier to obfuscate your exploit. Implementing something in C is also a lot more work, so you might be also inclined to use 3rd party library.
I never found it hard to add a C library to my projects using pkg-config. And yes, when the package came from Debian I have some trust that it is not a huge supply chain risk.
I think the problem started with the idea over language-level managers that are just github collections instead of curated distribution-level package managers. So my response "C has no good package manager" is: It should not have a packager manager and Cargo or npm or the countless Python managers should all not exist either.
pkg-config isn’t the hard bit though, is it?
Usually the hard bit with C libraries is having dependencies with dependencies all of which use their own complex build systems, a mix of Make, CMake, Autotools, Ninja, etc.
Then within that for e.g. a mix of using normal standard names for build parameters and not e.g. PROJECTNAME_COMPILER instead of CMAKE_C_COMPILER
The package manager takes care of the dependencies. And one does not need to compile the libraries one uses, so how complicated this is does not matter. I install the -dev package and I am done. This works beautifully and where it does not the right move would be to fix this.
I think in most of my projects, many of the C++ packages I used for work (lots of computer vision, video codecs etc) I had to compile and host myself. The latest and greatest of OpenCV, dlib or e.g. gstreamer weren't available on the distros I was using (Ubuntu, Fedora, Centos). They'd lag a year or more behind sometimes. Some stuff was outright not available at all via package manager - in any version.
So, yes, you do have to figure out how to build and package these things by yourself very often. There are also no "leftpad" or similar packages in C. If you don't want to write something yourself.
In constrast - virtually every software package of any version is available to you in cargo or npm.
Virtually every package is in cargo and npm because there is no curation. This is exactly why it is a supply-chain risk. The fix is to have a curated list of packages, but this is what Linux distribution are. There is no easy way out.
As GvR famously reminded everyone in 2011, a language and its packaging system are separate things.
But Rust, you know, has one.
> Critical infrastructure still written in C ... is technical debt that is only going to get worse over time.
No. Rust is not magic, it just forces a discipline in which certain safety checks can be made automatically (or are obviated entirely). In other languages like C, the programmer needs to perform those checks; and it's technical debt if the C code is not coded carefully and reviewed for such issues. If coding is careful and the code is review - there is no technical debt, or perhaps I should say no more than the unsafe parts of a rust codebase or the standard libraries. And the safety of critical infra code written in C gets _better_ over time, as such technical debt is repaid.
> Rust is explicitly designed to be what you'd get if you were to re-create C knowing what we know now about language design and code safety.
That's not true. First, it's not a well-defined statement, since "what we know now" about language design is, as it has always been, a matter of debate and a variety of opinions. But even regardless of that - C was a language with certain design choices and aesthetics. Rust does not at _all_ share those choices - even if you tack on "and it must be safe". For example: Rust is much richer language - in syntax, primitive types, and standard library - than C was intended to be.
> If coding is careful and the code is review - there is no technical debt, or perhaps I should say no more than the unsafe parts of a rust codebase or the standard libraries. And the safety of critical infra code written in C gets _better_ over time, as such technical debt is repaid.
How many decades have we tried this? How many more to see that it just hasn't panned out like you describe?
> If coding is careful and the code is review - there is no technical debt, or perhaps I should say no more than the unsafe parts of a rust codebase or the standard libraries.
History shows again and again that this statement is impossible..
Name a large C application that’s widely used, and I’ll show you at least one CVE that’s caused by a memory leak from the project
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While I get your view, I think examples would help to move the conversation along in a more constructive manner